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Abstract. This paper reviews recent work on the economics of fast growing developing
country cities, with a focus on Africa. It sets out some of the broad facts about African
urbanisation and summarises two recent pieces of research work. The first argues that
coordination failure can create multiple equilibria and divergent paths of development,
some in which cities are internationally competitive and able to create jobs, others in
which cities are stuck in a ‘non-tradables trap’. The second is a dynamic model of city
growth, calibrated to changing patterns of land-use in Nairobi; the calibration suggests a
very high cost of inefficient land use in the context of urban slums.
JEL classification: O18, O55, R0, R5
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1 Introduction
Urbanisation is part of the structural transformation that lies at the core of countries’
economic and social development. Cities offer the promise of high productivity and job
creation on a massive scale, but they can also continue to grow without delivering these
benefits. They are complex environments requiring both functional market economies
and extensive policy involvement. Yet our knowledge about patterns of growth and ‘what
works’ in developing cities is quite weak. What does it take to enable a city to undertake
investment – in houses, firms and factories, and in infrastructure – that keeps up with
population growth and can deliver both liveability and productivity? How should public
policy meet the numerous challenges that are faced? The experiences of East Asia and
of Africa over recent decades illustrate how quite different paths can be followed. East
Asian cities have, by and large, delivered productivity, jobs, and the housing and service
provision that make cities liveable. African cities have left a large majority of their
populations without either formal sector jobs or formal housing.
∗Paper based on keynote address at the European Regional Science Association 2017 Conference,
Groningen. Thanks to the conference organisers their invitation and audience for attention and feedback.
Some of the research reported in this paper was conducted with the support of an Africa Research
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Sustainable Urbanization of the World Bank and supported by the UK Department for International
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Source: http://www.eea.europa.eu/soer-2015/global/urban-world
Figure 1: Urban populations
Projections indicate that in the next 40 years the urban population of the developing
world will increase by 2 billion people. Most of this increase will be in Asia, but much the
largest proportionate increase will be in Africa. As indicated in Figure 1, Africa’s urban
population is set to nearly treble by 2050, adding 800 million people. This increment is
as much as the current urban populations of Europe and North America combined. Even
though urbanisation to date in Africa has been problematic, over the coming decades the
continent needs to build at least twice the urban capital stock that it has built over the
whole of previous history.
These observations motivate the case for better understanding urbanisation in devel-
oping economies and for using research to build the knowledge base needed to inform
urban policy. A joint programme of work by researchers at the LSE, Oxford, and the
World Bank has been working towards this goal for the last three years, and this paper
draws on some of the work done on the project. Its focus is Africa (sub-Saharan), and
principally on intra-city economics. What is going wrong, and what can be done about
it? In this review we start by outlining some of the ‘stylised facts’ of African urbanisation
and then focus on two particular pieces of work undertaken in the project. The final
section of the paper draws out some of the main messages that, we think, should underpin
policy choices in these cities.
2 Some stylised facts
Urbanisation and development. Urbanisation is an inherent part of economic develop-
ment, and is an unstoppable process, regardless of what government does. Causality
between urbanisation and development runs in both directions and through multiple
channels. The relationship between the two is however different in Africa than in
the historical experience of other regions. Urbanisation in Africa is occurring both
more rapidly and at somewhat lower income levels than has been the case elsewhere.
Urban population growth has been around twice as fast as was European growth at
an equivalent stage of urbanisation, and around 2 percentage points higher than
Asian urban population growth. There is also some indication that urbanisation is
not driving the demographic transition as fast as happened elsewhere, and most of
the increase in Africa’s urban population is natural increase rather than rural to
urban migration (Jedwab et al. 2017).
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Housing and the residential capital stock. African cities are short of capital of all
sorts, not least in the residential capital stock. Across the continent more than 60%
of the urban population lives in slums, generally single-story shacks, some crowded
in town centres, some sprawling on the fringes of the city. In countries such as
South Sudan and the Central African Republic, the slum proportion exceeds 90%
(UN-Habitat 2016). A key element of the housing stock – formal, private sector,
low-income housing – is largely absent from large cities (Collier, Venables 2015).
There are multiple reasons for this; land rights are often unclear and contested,
deterring the construction of long-lasting structures; land markets are imperfect,
so land is not held by those who value it most; inappropriately high building
regulations which cannot be met are simply ignored; financing is difficult as capital
and mortgage markets are weak or absent. These features all compound the fact
that, urbanising at low income levels, only a low standard of housing is affordable.
They mean not only that housing conditions are squalid, but also that land – the
ultimate scarce factor in cities – is inefficiently used.
Jobs and the productive capital stock. Just as much of the housing stock is informal,
so too is much employment. Estimates of the proportion of the urban labour
force with informal sector jobs (i.e., working outside a registered or incorporated
enterprise) range up to 80%. A feature of the African situation has been described
as ‘urbanisation without industrialisation’ (Gollin et al. 2016). This refers to the
fact that manufacturing production in African cities is much lower than in cities
in other regions at a similar stage of development. The share of employment in
manufacturing in large Asian cities is typically 25-30%, while in African cities it is
in the range 5-15%. Most of this is in ‘non-tradable’ sectors producing for the local
market. Internationally tradable manufacturing sectors are largely absent, a point
we will return to later in the paper.
Infrastructure and the private sector. There are many estimates of the African
infrastructure deficit. Annual spending needs have been estimated at around $90
billion, amounting to 15% of African GDP, while actual spending is running at
less than 2/3rds of this (Foster, Bricen˜o-Garmendia 2010). The largest elements
of this are power, water and sanitation, and connectivity. In each case the urban
component is large, totalling perhaps 10% of GDP per annum sustained over many
decades.
Collectively these financing needs – for residential, business, and infrastructure
capital, not to mention human capital – typically peak as urban population growth
peaks. Africa is not yet at this point, but financing needs might easily amount to as
much as 40% of GDP per annum. East Asian countries have achieved these rates
of investment financed by domestic saving. Domestic saving in Africa, typically
running at around 15% of GDP, is unlikely to do so.
Urban governance. Government has an essential role to play in the urban environ-
ment. The urban downsides of congestion and contagion mean that provision of
infrastructure and public goods and services is particularly important. Effective and
appropriate regulation is needed for land, building, and public health. And the for-
mation of a city requires a coordination process that cannot fully be resolved by the
market. Uncertainty about the future development of the city – for example, about
what areas will become future employment centres – will deter private investment.
In order to reduce this uncertainty, expectations of future city development need to
be coordinated around common knowledge of where development is likely to take
place. This can be done through the provision of credible city plans or, if plans are
incredible, through commitments of infrastructure and other public investments.
African cities are severely constrained in their ability to play these roles. Financially,
most African cities are dependent on central transfers for more than 80 % of their
operating revenues, and local government revenues have been estimated to account
for less than 1 % of GDP (Foster, Bricen˜o-Garmendia 2010). City administrations in
most major African cities are controlled by national opposition parties, reinforcing
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long-standing central government beliefs that cities are threats rather than assets.
To be effective, the authorising environment of city government needs to have broad
functional, spatial, and temporal ranges. Often, they have none of these things,
with functional responsibilities fragmented across central government line ministries,
spatial fragmentation as cities have grown faster than administrative boundaries
have been adjusted, and short run political imperatives dominating longer run
decision making.
3 The research agenda
The city is, from the economic perspective, a general equilibrium system. Millions of
different economic agents – households, firms and the public sector – take decisions
coordinated largely, but not entirely, by the market mechanism. All parts of the system
are inter-dependent meaning that the city, and policy within the city, have to be viewed in
the context of the entire system and not just element by element. The benchmark model
is that of a monocentric city with workers commuting to the centre to work and residential
areas spread around the centre, with density, building height, and rent declining with
distance from the centre1. This model is useful, but it requires modification in at least
three ways if it is to be usefully applied to low income and fast-growing cities.
First, a broad set of market failures and frictions have to be added. These include the
issues in the land, housing, and construction markets that were sketched above, and which
impede building on land and the efficient allocation of land between alternative uses.
They extend to the regulation of firms (for example, obstacles and charges to formalising
a productive enterprise) and in the labour market.
Second, the standard model and virtually all the developed country urban literature
is static, failing to model the growth process within cities2. We have already seen
that financing costs will be largest during the most rapid period of urban growth when
investment in structures and equipment is at its peak. Incorporating dynamics adds
further difficult issues, particularly since buildings (in the formal sector at least) are
long-lived and their construction incurs sunk costs. The current state of the city is
therefore determined by past actions, so mistaken or delayed decisions have persistent
effects, a point we will explore later. It also means that expectations about the future
development of the city – and hence the future behaviour of other investors – matter for
each individual deciding on an investment.
Third, a useful analysis must incorporate complementarities between different parts of
the city system. Many urban interactions create positive feedbacks and hence cumulative
causation processes, leading to either ‘virtuous’ or ‘vicious’ circles of development. This
can occur through many channels. Agglomeration economies are the most direct. The
productivity advantages created by scale, density, and consequent intense economic
interaction are well-researched for developed, and now also some developing, countries
(Glaeser, Xiong 2017). These arise because of positive externalities, either technological
(e.g. knowledge spillovers) or pecuniary (i.e. through interaction in imperfect markets).
They are generated between different firms (forward and backward linkages in the language
of old development economics, e.g. Myrdal 1957), between firms and workers, and between
firms and consumers. We know that their effect is substantial with a doubling city of city
size raising productivity somewhere in the range of 4%–5%.
This productivity gain is one of the reasons why cities exist, and it has a further
implication that is particularly important in a fast-growing city. Agglomeration economies
mean that is difficult to start activities in new places. This is the first-mover problem;
if a firm were to move out of an established centre to a new place it would forego the
productivity advantage of agglomeration. In a situation of dynamic change, it follows
that movement to new places will be delayed, unless they can be coordinated as collective
movement by a large number of firms and households, something that is very hard to
achieve. If movement to new places is delayed then the city system will tend to exhibit
excess primacy; the largest city will continue growing as it is privately (although not
1The model Alonso-Mills-Muth model: see Duranton, Puga (2015) for a modern statement.
2But see Desmet, Henderson (2015) for a review of growth of city systems as a whole.
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socially) unattractive to set up in secondary cities. Within an existing city, it may be
difficult for new sub-centres to form, and difficult to attract new sectors of productive
activity, this accounting in part for the high levels of informal unemployment that are
observed.
Agglomeration economies are not the only mechanism that creates positive feedbacks.
Another is the fiscal system. Functional cities require infrastructure, but funding this
requires a tax base which is present only if the city is functional. In a dynamic setting
where the capital is required at an early stage of development this requires borrowing on
the strength of the expected future tax base of the city – something that African cities
are likely to find hard to do.
These are just some of the issues that need to be in the research agenda. Analytical
thinking on these topics needs to be to be accompanied by empirical work to build an
evidence base on city performance and on the effects of policy3. The following two sections
of the paper turns to a discussion of two of the pieces of analytical work that have been
done in the course of the LSE/ Oxford/ World Bank project, looking first at a model of
Africa’s difficulty in establishing tradable manufacturing sectors, and then at land-use
inefficiencies in a growing city4.
4 Breaking into tradables5
A summary way to think about the general equilibrium of a city is as the balance between
two forces. One is urban productivity, saying that larger cities generate higher productivity.
The other is urban costs per worker, increasing in city size and consisting of commuting
and congestion costs, and also land rent paid by workers in the city6. Equilibrium city
size is where workers’ productivity minus urban costs is equal to the productivity of
workers outside the city. At this point there is no incentive for workers to migrate either
to or from the city.
The standard diagram illustrating this is Figure 2a, where the horizontal axis is city
size (the number of workers) and the vertical is labour productivity, equal to wages. The
labour demand curve is the amount firms are willing to pay for workers, so is equal to
productivity; it is drawn upward sloping because of agglomeration economies. The labour
supply curve is what workers need to be paid to take a job in the city. The wage outside
the city is w0, and workers incur a package of urban costs, increasing in city size as
illustrated. The equilibrium is at point E and – in the simplest case – urban land rents
are the area below the dashed line and above the labour supply curve.
This simple case rests on many assumptions, one of which we now relax. In reality
the city will contain many different productive activities, in some of which productivity
is increasing in employment or city size, while in others it is decreasing. Critically, it is
value productivity that matters, and this is equal to physical productivity per worker
times the price of output. For goods that are internationally tradable the price faced by
any one city is constant. However, for ‘non-tradables’, i.e. goods that are sold only in the
local or national market, the price will decline with the volume sold. Thus, we expect
such sectors to exhibit overall diminishing returns to scale, as price effects dominate any
physical increasing returns that may be present. The productivity schedule in the figure
will therefore contain both a diminishing returns segment, and a segment with increasing
returns to scale.
This case is illustrated on Figure 2b. The labour supply curve is as before, but
labour demand now contains two sections. The downward one is labour demand from
non-tradables production, downward sloping because falling output price outweighs
any physical productivity gains from expanding output. The upward sloping section is
3Empirical work on the effects of place-based policy is notoriously difficult for three reasons. The
context specificity of particular projects and places, and hence the difficulty of generalising. The
identification of causal effect. And, given the possibility of displacement of economic activity, the difficulty
of finding a meaningful set of control locations.
4See Lall et al. (2017) for a review of other parts of this project.
5This section is based on Venables (2017).
6Rent is a cost to workers but, since it is paid to landlords, is not a real resource cost as are commuting
and congestion.
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(a) The monocentric city (b) the non-tradables trap
Figure 2: Equilibrium city size
employment in tradable activities, where the price is fixed on world markets and there are
agglomeration economies. Details of the construction of the figure are given in Venables
(2017) and here we simply draw out its implications. As illustrated, there are three
intersections of the productivity schedule with urban costs. The two with solid circles,
labelled E− and E+ are stable, while that with the hollow circle, Eu is unstable (since if
L is slightly greater than this then urban productivity is greater than costs, so the city
will expand away from this point until it reaches E+).
Equilibrium E+ has production of both tradable and non-tradable goods. The city is
large, with high productivity, high nominal wage, but high urban costs, land prices, and
rent. As well as creating many jobs, the city yields a large economic surplus as rents, the
transfer to landowners, are high. In contrast, at point E- the city has only non-tradables,
supplying the city itself and its local hinterland. This point is an equilibrium because if
any one (small) firm were to establish tradable production its productivity would be w∗,
i.e. productivity in the absence of agglomeration economics from other tradable sector
firms in the city. This is less than the going wage at E−, so the entrant would make a
loss. Entry is profitable only if productivity in tradables exceeds the going wage at E−
and this, in our simple story, requires coordinated entry by a mass of producers in the
tradable goods sector.
We learn several things from this simple example. First, although two cities might
have very similar or identical fundamentals, an urban dichotomy can emerge. One city
booms, with tradable production and employment at E+. The other is stuck in a low-level
equilibrium at E−. Second, the low-level trap is more of a risk if demand for non-tradables
is high, this shifting the downward sloping section of the productivity curve to the right.
This in turn is likely if the city or its hinterland is spending a lot from income received
from other sources, possibly natural resource rents or foreign development assistance.
This is an example of the ‘Dutch disease’ whereby foreign exchange from natural resource
rents crowds out other foreign exchange earning activities.
What about policy to get out of this low-level trap? Efficient land-use and provision
of infrastructure and public services will shift the cost curve downwards. This lowers the
nominal (but not the real) wage in the city, moving intersection point E− downwards
and to the right. However, costs have to drop low enough for this point to cease to
be an equilibrium, occurring when the wage drops below that which triggers tradable
production, w∗.
One final point comes from this analysis. In a fully specified model which included
housing construction, the two equilibria would have quite different housing stocks and
urban density. At E+ land rents are high so land is used intensively, e.g., by building
tall; this is not the case at E−, and this makes the low-level equilibrium trap more
severe. Essentially, at E− the city is optimised for small-scale local production, while at
E+ it is optimised for the scale associated with both non-tradable and internationally
competitive tradable production. A city in which construction is optimised for E− is
going to look even less attractive for potential entrants in the tradables sector. This
point emphasises the depth of the coordination failure and the role of expectations. It is
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not just whether firms in tradable goods production expect the tradable sector to grow
to a high productivity level. It is whether or not builders and developers build in the
expectation of the city growing to this scale. If they do not then their expectations can be
self-fulfilling, as the city they construct is low density and thereby offers poor connectivity
so is unable to attract these sectors.
5 Building the city7
The second paper that we discuss focuses on the dynamics of city growth and the long-run
implications of inefficient land-use. It contains two parts, the first setting out a full
dynamic model of a growing city and the second calibrating the model to Nairobi and
calculating the efficiency cost of patches of land near the city remaining in slum use, as
exemplified by Kibera, Nairobi and Africa’s largest slum.
In order to focus on land-use and the way in which the city is built, we assume in this
paper that there is an exogenous process of urban productivity growth that is attracting
population to the city and causing the price of housing at each point in the city to grow
at a constant exponential rate. How is land used and what gets built where and when as
this process continues?
Land can have three types of use. One is that it is outside the city, earning a constant
rent in agricultural use. The second is that is a slum, occupied by informal sector buildings.
These buildings have several key characteristics. They are cheap to construct, but cannot
be built tall (typically being made of mud or sheet steel). High density per unit land
can be achieved, but only by crowding, this reducing floor space and the well-being of
residents. And the building material is malleable (like lego or meccano) so buildings
can be readily reshaped and reconstructed. It follows from this that there are no sunk
costs and hence future expectations are unimportant in construction decisions; when
circumstances change, the building gets changed.
The third type of land-use is formal sector building. This is more expensive and can
be built tall. Thus, the margin for increasing density is height, not crowding. The cost of
achieving density is therefore not loss of amenity, but increasing unit construction cost.
Furthermore, these structures are not malleable; once built they cannot be reshaped,
although they can (and will) be demolished and rebuilt from scratch. This means that
expectations of future prices and rents are crucial to the way they are constructed; if the
city is expected to grow fast, with rapidly increasing rents, formal sector buildings will be
constructed taller in order to deliver greater density and capitalise on expected future
rents.
As the city develops land-use goes through phases, as illustrated on Figure 3a. This
figure has distance from the city centre (CBD) and time on the axes on the horizontal
plane, and building volume on the vertical. To interpret the figure, take a given distance
from the CBD (e.g., a distance of 10) and trace the development of this point through
time (moving up and right across the figure). Initially land at this distance from the CBD
is rural, i.e., outside the city with building height and volume of zero. It then becomes
informal settlement, which initially is not very dense, although density increases as the
city grows and the lego blocks are reconfigured to deliver more density. At some date
land is formalised, and this brings a step up in density. Once built, formal structures
cannot be changed so building volume remains constant for a period of time ∆τ . Rents
are increasing, and the volume constructed is based on perfect expectations about this
future growth in rents, and hence about the date of redevelopment. This is the next step
upwards, occurring at the date at which it is efficient (and profit maximising) to demolish
the first generation formal structure and redevelop with a taller structure, giving more
volume per unit land. These cycles of redevelopment repeat through time as the city
continues to grow.
The figure can also be read by slicing in the opposite direction, i.e., looking at a
cross-section of the city at a particular date. The centre is built dense, (it has been
through several waves of redevelopment), while further out is less dense formal, then
7This section draws on Henderson et al. (2016).
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(a) Urban development with perfect foresight (b) Formalisation costs
Figure 3: Phases of land-use in city development
informal, then rural. Notice that young cities are relatively flat, while more mature cities
exhibit much larger volume and density gradients.
This gives the dynamics of city growth in the absence of any imperfections. In this
perfect environment formal sector developers have perfect foresight (i.e., self-fulfilling
expectations) about the growth of the city. Making expectations more pessimistic
than this has the effect of delaying first development and shortening intervals between
redevelopment; developers ‘under-build’ as they under-estimate price and rental growth.
The paper focuses on a different imperfection, namely the presence of obstacles to
formalisation, the conversion of land from slum or informal use to formal. There are many
such obstacles, typically created by unclear land rights, the difficulty of moving slum
residents and, in cases such as Kibera, the power and political connections of ‘slum-lords’
who are earning rents on the settlement. Figure 3b recomputes Figure 3a but with a
range of land in which such obstacles are present. As expected, formalisation is delayed.
This also has the consequence that when formalisation occurs it is denser (recall that land
prices and rents are rising steadily through time), and this echoes through the timing of
subsequent redevelopments. If obstacles to redevelopment vary across different places,
then the city becomes a ‘hodge-podge’, with neighbouring pieces of land developed to
quite different densities, and the possibility that slums persist in central areas for long
periods of time. This gives the familiar image of developing country cities, with slums
adjacent to high rise buildings. Central area slums are much denser and more crowded
than those on the edge, and have higher land rents.
The second part of the paper calibrates this model to Nairobi. The calibration is based
on five distinct types of data. Aerial photography for two points in time, from which
the footprint of every building in the city is traced: lidar data (available only for one
time period), giving the height of structures: the asking price of vacant land at precisely
known locations, scraped from the web: survey data on rentals and aspects of building
quality in both the formal and informal sectors: and finally, there are also maps giving
the location of areas classified, by previous on-the-ground studies, as slums.
The data reveals very high rates of demolition and redevelopment in the city, these
running at around 30% per decade, compared to less than 10% in a typical US city.
The data validates elements of the model, for example density decreasing steadily with
distance from the centre, this taking the form of decreasing height with constant ground
cover in the formal sector, while in slums it is decreasing ground cover or crowding, at
constant height.
The data also allow calibration of the model, recovering all the key parameters used
in the theory. With the model calibrated, we can conduct counterfactual experiments,
the main one being to calculate the real income loss of land remaining in informal (slum)
use beyond the date at which efficiency suggests it should have been formalised. We
find that, in a slum area relatively close to the city centre, such as Kibera, the cost of
delayed formalisation is high. The present value real income loss from never formalising,
relative for formalising today, amounts to around $17,000 per household, even if full
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compensation were paid to slum-lords, in a context where average household rent is around
$700 per year. Of course, this is only one side of the equation. Redeveloping a slum
incurs dislocation costs and the disruption of communities. Nevertheless, the calculation
provides an indication of the potential gains from ensuring that timely redevelopment
takes place.
6 Achieving productivity, managing costs
The urban equilibrium balances urban productivity against urban costs. There are
multiple reasons why the market mechanism does not – and cannot – do this in a perfect
‘first-best efficient’ way. The policy challenge is both to manage and contain urban costs,
and to create and coordinate the environment that enables the private sector to achieve
productivity. In the urban environment far more than in other contexts, this requires
smart and well-motivated public policy. There are numerous aspects to this, and we
conclude with a few of the main ones.
Urban costs are brought down by using land efficiently. Labour and capital are in
elastic supply to the city, and it is land that is the scarce factor. Securing efficient
land-use requires that markets work well – the rental market, the land market, and
markets for complementary activities such as mortgages, building materials, and for
skilled construction labour and firms. While effective markets are needed, achieving
this is not simply a matter of deregulation. The institutional and legal systems need to
support clear and enforceable property rights. Building regulations are essential to control
potential externalities such as fire risk and to fill informational gaps; the foundations
of a house cannot be inspected every time it is traded, so need to be guaranteed by
regulation. Provision of decent low-income housing in cities is always problematic and
generally requires public investment in the housing stock.
Provision of public services and infrastructure also brings down urban costs. Human
well-being is raised by the provision of clean water, sanitation, and public amenities
and services, essential to counter the negative externalities of close human contact. The
direct benefit of providing these services to households and workers translates into a lower
supply price of effective labour to firms, thereby bringing down employment costs and
improving competitiveness.
Achieving high productivity requires that firms have access to required inputs, to
markets for their output, and to the scale and density of economic interaction that
supports agglomeration economies. This can be summarised in the word ‘connectivity’,
and has two distinct elements. One is density which, as we saw in sections 4 and 5, requires
expectations that encourage building formal structures in timely manner. The other is
transport infrastructure to mitigate the acute congestion problems of many African cities.
A key point about each of preceding three paragraphs is the need to see the city
as a whole. Improving liveability for workers reduces costs for firms. Clarifying land
markets leads to better building quality, and hence also to higher density that facilitates
agglomeration. The placement of infrastructure, firms, and housing developments are
crucial in securing connectivity. Most investment decisions in the city, as elsewhere, are
coordinated by markets but we have seen the interdependence of private investment
decisions and the role of expectations in shaping such lumpy and long-lasting decisions.
If investors do not know which part of a city is most likely to develop as a sub-centre
then they will hold back, not investing at all. A coordinating agent – the city government
– needs a way of credibly signalling where the new sub-centre will be. This could be
through city plans, although often these have no credibility, so signals need to take the
concrete form of investment in infrastructure and other structures. The plans drawn
up by architects and city planners too often fail to recognise the challenge of attracting
jobs; it is easy to plan a future city, but the challenge is to ensure that there is a path to
populate it, with firms as well as with people.
Of course, city governments face numerous constraints in playing these roles. Political
constraints mean that city governments do not have the breadth of authority to act
effectively, or the time horizon to make the long-term investments that are needed. The
financial constraint is generally acute with little revenue raised from local taxation and
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dependence on grants from a not always willing central government. Recognising the
fact that there is an urban surplus, and that much of it accrues to land owners is crucial.
Taxing urban land is equitable, is ethical (land appreciation is due to its location, not the
effort of whoever happens to own it) and economically efficient. It is a fiscal resource that
is too often under used. And there is a knowledge constraint. Little research has been
done on Africa’s urban transformation (compare it with the amount of research on rural
activities), little of the stock of what we know has been disseminated to policy-makers,
and still less has been communicated to the citizens who will shape the future of these
cities.
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